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representations of 
conflict in North Maluku,
eastern Indonesia
In mid-August 1999 violence broke out on the
eastern Indonesian island of Halmahera over the
creation of new administrative boundaries. 
What started as a dispute over redistricting
quickly took on religious overtones and left
several thousand dead and over 220,000 people
displaced over the course of the next 10 months.
This conflict was not unique in turn of the
century Indonesia; similar conflicts had erupted in
Central Sulawesi (Aragon 2001), West
Kalimantan (Davidson 2003), Maluku (Klinken
2001) and elsewhere. These outbreaks of
communal violence have become a favorite topic
of academics interested in Indonesia (cf. Wemmer
and Wimhöfer 2001; Colombijn and Linbald
2002; Bertrand 2004; Coppel 2004; Klinken
2007; Sidel 2007). Much of this academic
discussion concerns the causes of the violence
and scholars have put forth numerous theoretical
explanations. They argue the relative merits of
instrumentalist approaches that highlight the role
of elites or culturalist approaches that attempt to
place the violence within the larger cultural and
historical context of a particular society (cf.
Bubandt 2000; Aragon 2001; Davidson 2003).
For example, they have debated the importance
of a rising middle class (Klinken 2005) as opposed
to the millenarian tendencies of North Moluccans
(Bubandt 2000) as mitigating causes for the
violence in North Maluku. Others have put forth
conspiracy theories that attempt to explain the
various outbreaks of violence as efforts by the
former President Suharto or his cronies to hold
onto power or to discredit the reform movement
(cf. Aditjondro 2001).
One shortcoming of these various approaches,
particularly instrumentalist ones, is that they fail
to grasp how the violence was understood and
experienced on the ground. What caused people 
to take up arms against their neighbours? What
made certain interpretations of the violence
plausible to local people? In order to understand
these events, academics must pay attention to
the agency of the violence, to look at how it was
experienced by local people and how these lived
experiences in turn affected the eventual course
of the violence (Mamdani 2001: 7-8). Simply
explaining the violence as a conflict over
resources, or the result of instigations from the
political elite, is too simple. It fails to account for
how local people and local communities were
caught up in events that overturned the
established social order in North Maluku and
elsewhere. These metanarratives often overlook
the details of particular events and how these
events were experienced and understood by
perpetrators and victims and how these
understandings changed over time. 
Anthropologists who study communal conflict
have tried to move beyond this purely
instrumentalist approach to understanding
violence and to include non-political aspects of
violence in their examinations of communal
conflict. Some of these anthropological
approaches have examined the symbolic and
ritual dimensions of violence (Feldman 1991;
Tambiah 1996; Zulaika 1988). Some have tried to
combine larger cultural models with microlevel
psychological factors to understand large-scale
violence (cf. Hinton 1998). Others have
attempted to understand outbreaks of communal
violence through the analysis of how people talk
about it. For example, Mironko’s (2004) work on
the genocide in Rwanda provides a discourse
analysis of how Hutu participants in the genocide
talk about their motivations for taking part. From
this nuanced examination of ways of speaking,
Mironko is able to identify the cultural
perceptions and ideologies embedded in these
accounts and find insights about popular
participation in the Rwandan violence. Although
not undertaking a discourse analysis as Mironko
has done, in this paper I seek to examine how
North Moluccans discuss the violence and how
the details of these ways of speaking affected
people’s motivations for taking part. 
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directly involved is to examine how they talk
about the violence amongst themselves or with
others. How do people who took part in the
fighting, either as victims or as perpetrators,
describe the violence? Although a number of
scholars have examined how the media (cf. Spyer
2001, 2002, 2003; Aragon 2005; Fox 2005) or
internet users (cf. Hill and Sen 2002; Bräuchler
2003, 2004) discuss conflict in Indonesia, very
few have actually explored in detail how
participants talk about, or take part in, violence
(see Timmer 2002 for a rare exception). Although
one could argue that this omission stems from a
lack of access to conflict regions, there were at
various points hundreds of thousands of
displaced people throughout in Indonesia who
had fled conflict zones and could have been
interviewed or surveyed in relative safety.
Scholars, however, appear to be averse to
investigating communal violence at this level of
detail, opting rather for analysis from afar or a
reliance on bland metanarratives to understand
outbreaks of communal violence. In what follows
I contrast the reluctance of scholars to discuss the
details of violent conflict with how victims and
perpetrators discuss these acts. I argue that
scholars’ avoidance of detail out of a concern for
the sensitivity of others (more often their own
colleagues than the people under discussion) and
their focus on chronologies and causal models of
conflict limit the explanatory power of their
arguments (cf. Das 1984; Avruch 2001).1
In contrast, victims and participants are quite
aware of the explanatory and persuasive 
power inherent in detailed accounts of 
violence and deploy these descriptions to 
achieve various goals.
A brief review of the conflict in 
North Maluku
The Southeast Asian nation of Indonesia is no
stranger to violence. President Suharto, who
ruled the archipelago from 1967 until 1998,
came to power in an anti-communist bloodbath
that claimed over half a million lives (Cribb
1990). Once in power he was never reluctant to
use violence to achieve his goals whether putting
down separatists or enforcing government
forestry policy. Some would argue that it was his
willingness to use violence and the strength of
his military and police that enabled him to hold
together such a diverse nation: home to five of
the world’s major religions, over 300 hundred
ethnic groups, speaking just as many languages,
spread across 13,000 islands. However, the Asian
financial crisis of 1997, the subsequent
devaluation of the Indonesian Rupiah, and 
the increasing evidence of the first families’
corruption, loosened Suharto’s grip on 
power and eventually forced him to resign 
(cf. Dijk 2000). 
With Suharto’s fall from power (and in some
cases before that) violence broke out in various
places across the archipelago, including anti-
Chinese riots in several major cities, renewed
calls for separatism in Aceh and West Papua,
and outbreaks of communal violence in
Indonesian Borneo (Kalimantan) and Central
Sulawesi (see map p.5). One of the longest
running conflicts began in the Moluccan capital
of Ambon in January 1999. A dispute between a
bus driver and a passenger quickly escalated into
large-scale communal violence pitting Christians
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1 An increasing number of authors have chosen to forefront
violence in their work, particularly those who work in conflict
zones throughout the world (cf. Sluka 1989; Feldman 1991;
Hutchinson 1996; Nordstrom 1997; Taylor 1999).against Muslims in Ambon and on surrounding
islands.2 A province that had once been held up
as an example of religious tolerance was now
associated with communal violence and religious
cleansing. Newspaper journalists started using
the name of the town as a verb meaning “to
erupt in collective violence (diambonkan)” 
(cf. Bali Post 2000).
As the fighting raged in Ambon and central
Maluku, the northern parts of the province,
what would soon become the separate province
of North Maluku, remained peaceful (See Map
2).3 However, in mid-August 1999 violence
erupted on the island of Halmahera in the sub-
district of Kao between Makian migrants and
indigenous people. The dispute centered on a
local redistricting initiative that would have given
the Makian migrants their own sub-district
carved out of the Kao sub-district. The new sub-
district would consist of all the Makian villages
that were established in 1975 when the
Indonesian government moved the Makian from
their homes on Makian Island to empty land in
Kao to protect them from a predicted volcanic
eruption. As is often the case in Indonesian
resettlement schemes, this empty land actually
belonged to indigenous groups in the area
(Duncan 2002). In this instance, most 
of the land was claimed by the indigenous Pagu
people who were less then pleased with its
annexation by newcomers. Over the next 25
years relations between the Makian and their
new neighbors were rarely more than cordial.
The indigenous people remained upset over the
loss of their land and were offended by what
they perceived as the privileged treatment given
to the Makian by the local government. The
people of Kao also accused them of being
culturally insensitive and religiously intolerant. 
In response, the Makian argued that the
indigenous people were lazy and resented 
the Makian for their economic and 
political successes. 
The conflict in 1999 revolved around the
inclusion of several indigenous Pagu villages in
the proposed new sub-district. The Pagu people
were not pleased with this decision. They had 
no desire to be ruled by the Makian or to be
separated from their indigenous brethren with 
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people of Kao have a strong sense of unity
based in their adat belief that the four “tribes”
of Kao (the Pagu, Modole, Tobelo Boeng and
Kao Islam) can not be divided. The inclusion of
the four Pagu villages in a new Makian sub-
district was seen as an affront to this historical
unity. Despite protests from the indigenous
population, the government went ahead with
the re-districting. Fighting eventually broke out
on August 18, the same day that the new sub-
district was to be formalized. In the ensuing
violence the Makian burnt down two Pagu
villages. Security forces quickly intervened to 
stop the violence, but the problem remained
unresolved. The Makian remained determined 
to have their new sub-district and the Kao
remained as equally determined to stop it.
Disturbances broke out again in October, this
time resulting in the total defeat of the Makian
by the indigenous population. Approximately
15,000 Makian internally displaced persons
(IDPs) fled to Ternate and Tidore. 
The violence then spread to the islands of 
Tidore and Ternate with the appearance of a
contentious letter calling for Christians to cleanse
the region of Muslims. This letter infuriated parts
of the Muslim community and the ensuing riots
forced around 13,000 people, mainly Christians,
to flee from Tidore and Ternate to North
Sulawesi and Halmahera. These riots were
followed by “Muslim” attacks on the central and
southern regions of Halmahera that forced
thousands of Christians to flee to North Sulawesi
and northern Halmahera. At the end of 1999,
after months of tension, fighting broke out in
the town of Tobelo resulting in the deaths of
several hundred Muslims and the complete
destruction of their homes and mosques.
Provocative media accounts of events in Tobelo
played a role in the creation of the Laskar Jihad,
a group of self-proclaimed Muslim “Holy
Warriors” who vowed to help their religious
brethren in eastern Indonesia. In North Maluku,
a small number of these Laskar Jihad troops
joined with local Muslim militias and attacked
and destroyed a number of Christian villages
before the major hostilities came to a halt in June
2000. By the time the violence had stopped, few
areas were unaffected and over 220,000 people
(almost one quarter of the population) had been
displaced from their homes.
Depicting violence: how important 
are the details?
Depicting violence may upset or offend
people: it should, I think. Violence, in fact, 
is revolting. An accurate depiction must be
that, too. If not, it depersonalizes both the
perpetrators and, especially, the victims of
violence (Dentan 2000).
The brief account presented above conveys what
happened in North Maluku as a series of events
and dates along a timeline. Chronologies such as
these provide a general picture, but they do they
not convey the horror, the suffering, or in some
cases the exhilaration of the violence. Are
portraying these aspects of conflict important?
Academics usually avoid the violence itself, the
bloodshed, death and destruction; they focus on
the causes or the after-effects. The violence that
actually occurred is a disturbing topic that brings
up disconcerting images, ones that we set apart,
or omit from our discussions. Nordstrom (1997:
17) notes this aversion among scholars to
discussing these details: “There is a powerful yet
often unstated cultural perception that hearing
about violence is, in some curious existential
inversion, worse than enduring it”. On the other
end of the spectrum Daniels (1996: 4) notes:
“When faced with the risk of an account’s being
fattened up into prurience, flattening it down
into theory presents itself as the easy alternative
to the scholar.” By “flattening out” the violence,
by removing its “brutal immediacy”, it becomes
far more amenable to discussion or to theorizing
(Daniels 1996: 4). Das (1984: 5) refers to this
avoidance of detail as “unconscious censorship”.
Daniels (1996: 4) points out that anthropologists
are faced with a quandary: they can present the
details and be accused of prurience or flatten
out accounts of violence to the point where they
6 The Devil is in the Detailsare theoretically palatable. The latter approach,
however, removes the “brutal immediacy” that is
vital to understanding violence in the first place.
Anthropological discussions of the violence in
Indonesia have tended to flatten out descriptions
of violence in an effort to theorize causal
explanations. In many cases the violence is
omitted altogether and only competing theories
are discussed (cf. Klinken 2005).
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Halmahera and surrounding islandsThese concerns with toning down violence have
not only affected the content of scholarly
writings about conflict in Indonesia, but have
also affected the tone of some journalistic
accounts. In her work on the role of the media
in the Moluccan conflict Patricia Spyer (2003)
notes that some journalists adopted the tactic of
“deliberate obfuscation” in their reporting. They
avoided mentioning factors they though might
lead to more violence, such as the religion of the
perpetrators or victims, how people were killed,
or the type of religious building that was
destroyed. They hoped that omitting such details
would prevent their news stories from being
used as ammunition by those involved in the
conflict. One only has to look at the effect of the
incendiary media accounts published about the
violence in Tobelo to see the impact that
provocative journalism can have on conflict
situations (cf. Republika 2000). These media
accounts  led to a national outcry, large-scale
protests, and the subsequent intensification of
violence in various parts of eastern Indonesia.
Although these journalists’ concerns were well-
founded, Spyer (2003) argues that such toned-
down accounts can cause people who are
seeking information to turn to more subjective
and usually more provocative media in search of
compelling news.
Scholars seem to have this predilection for
“deliberate obfuscation” as well, but for
different reasons.4 Academics are not journalists,
and we work (for better or for worse) under
different constraints and for different audiences.
Scholars often argue that we should set aside
the graphic descriptions in order to avoid writing
“a pornography of violence”.5 But are we
missing something by leaving out these
descriptions? Obfuscation can prove detrimental
to the explanatory power of narratives of
violence. By leaving out the details we restrict
our ability to convey what happened both in a
descriptive sense, as well as conveying what took
place as our informants experienced it. In the
case of North Maluku, I argue that these
disturbing details, the ones so often set aside as
inappropriate for discussion, are vital to
understanding why the violence took the course
that it did. These details often provided the
inspiration and justification for further attacks.
The actual stories concerning the deaths and
destruction wrought by the opposing side, the
way they were phrased, whether about the
killing of children, the disfigurement of
individuals, or the destruction of religious
buildings, are crucial to understanding what
happened. People shaped their notions of
victimization and suffering through these 
stories and detailed descriptions. It is these
details that fuel the “social production of hate”
(Das 1998) that, in turn, feeds people’s decisions
to engage in violence.
Payahe and Tobelo: 
the importance of detail
There are numerous examples in North Maluku
where the gruesome particularities of certain
incidents are crucial to understanding the course
of the violence and people’s willingness to take
part. The violence that took place in the village
of Payahe in the sub-district of Oba in central
Halmahera provides one example (see map p.7).6
As noted above, after the violence had subsided
on the islands of Ternate and Tidore it spread to
central Halmahera. Lying directly across the strait
from Ternate and Tidore the small Christian
population in the sub-district of Oba presented
an easy target for “Muslim” (mainly Makian)
forces. Over the course of November 1999 these
forces destroyed almost every Christian
community. Virtually all Christians, as well as
some Muslims, fled the region, including the
Christian community from the village of Payahe.
As the displaced from Payahe trickled into Tobelo
in late November and early December they
brought with them horrific stories that they
shared with their new hosts. In addition to the 
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this matter.
5 See Rodgers (2001: 18) for a good discussion of the use of the
term “pornography” to describe descriptions of violence.
6 Throughout this paper I refer to sub-district boundaries as they
were established prior to their realignment in 2002.standard tales of betrayal, murder and flight
through the forested interior, they told a
particular story about the murder of young
children that became a staple in Christian
accounts of the violence. I heard the story
numerous times over the course of 18 months 
of research, for example:
When they [the Muslims] attacked us [in
Payahe], we were not ready. We had no
weapons. A few days before they invaded
some people had threatened to attack us,
but the village head and the police told us
we did not need to worry. Some of us were
scared, but they said they would protect us.
They lied. . . When they [the Muslims]
attacked us they had lots of weapons, guns
and bombs. But all we had were machetes
and bows and arrows. We could not fight
them off so we had to run into the forest.
Not everyone got away. They [the Muslims]
caught some young children and killed
them. For no reason. They tied the wrists of
the small children and put them in rice
sacks. They took them out into the ocean
and tossed them in the ocean. When they
ran out of fuel they beat the children to
death with wood. The same way people kill
a dog. (An IDP woman from Payahe
recorded in Tobelo).
Although a disturbing story, these images of
violence against children are integral to
understanding the ensuing course of events in
Tobelo later that year. This story about the
murder of children, whether based in reality or
on rumour and exaggeration, outraged
Christians in Tobelo and elsewhere. People cited
these reputed atrocities in Payahe as one of the
justifications for the intensity of subsequent
violence in Tobelo that left hundreds of Muslims,
including women and children, dead.
Christians throughout Halmahera frequently
cited the example of Payahe when discussing the
violence in Tobelo. The riots in Ternate and
Tidore had been a tragedy, but it was more
about the destruction of property and a violation
of trust than a loss of life. That had changed in
Payahe. For example, when asked about the
intensity of the fighting in Tobelo one displaced
Christian in Manado noted: “We saw what they
[the Muslims] did in Ternate and Tidore. Then we
heard about Payahe where they killed those
children. . .  We realized that if we did not kill
them, they would kill us. That is why so many
Muslims were killed in Tobelo, people were
angry about Payahe. They wanted revenge”.
Muslims from Tobelo corroborate the effect that
these stories had on the atmosphere in Tobelo.
Many noted how tensions increased after the
Payahe IDPs began arriving. According to some
Muslims sources, it was at this point that many
Christians started arming themselves.
Whether the stories from Payahe are true or not
is largely irrelevant. In 2002, the story remained
an accepted fact among the Christian population
at large. Nearly three years after the violence,
one could still see where people had spray-
painted “Payahe” on the walls of burnt out
mosques and destroyed Muslim homes in the
Tobelo region. It was the particular details of the
Payahe violence that gave the story its power. If
the story had been about some children killed in
the course of fighting it would have been tragic,
but it would have been one tragedy among
many and would not have attained the defining
role that it did. Ironically, the violence committed
against Muslims in Tobelo, in part a reaction to
the violence in Payahe, provided Muslims with
the same sort of pivotal incident that rallied
others to their cause and justified future actions.
The second example concerns the violence in the
sub-district of Tobelo in northern Halmahera in
late 1999 that resulted in the death of several
hundred Muslims. When the fighting reached
the village of Popilo to the north of Tobelo town,
the outnumbered Muslims retreated to one of
the village mosques either for protection (the
Muslim claim) or to rally their forces (the
Christian claim). The Christians pressed the
attack and destroyed the mosque and killed a
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Fighting also took place to the south of Tobelo
town as Christians and Muslims fought in the
Muslim village of Togoliua leading to the
complete destruction of that village and the
death of a large number of its inhabitants. 
The violence that took place in Tobelo was, as
elsewhere, horrific. However, the main difference
this time was the large number of people killed
(estimates range between 771 and 3000
people), including a large number of women
and children. Eyewitness accounts from survivors
quickly spread throughout the Muslim
community. For example, one survivor, a woman
from the Muslim village of Togoliua, recounted
her story: 
When they [the Christians] invaded there
were too many people so we fled to the
mosque. When we got to the mosque they
started knocking in the mosque windows
and [they] were able to get into the mosque
and starting hacking at people. I was cut,
but I did not see it because I was under
people. Those that were still alive were
hacked at again. . . Many women were
killed in the mosque . . . from bombs, from
being chopped up. 
The details of this violence, in particular the
video images of the aftermath made available
on video compact discs (VCDs) (the charred
corpses, dead children, mass graves, etc.)
enraged North Moluccan Muslims and Muslims
throughout Indonesia. This anger justified
violence elsewhere and played a role in the
creation of the Laskar Jihad whose intervention
in Maluku, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi
prolonged all of these conflicts (cf. International
Crisis Group 2004).
The stories of the violence in Payahe and in
Tobelo told by survivors and others caught
people’s imagination and (for some) confirmed
their worst fears. The details surrounding the
death of children in Payahe and the large-scale
killings in Tobelo were crucial to people’s
interpretation of these events and the role they
played in justifying actions or inactions. By
omitting the particular details specific to these
two events, we remove their explanatory power.
How North Moluccans talk 
about violence
Although scholars often avoid discussing the
particular details of violence, many of the people
I interviewed in North Maluku and North
Sulawesi did not share these reservations.
Whereas others talk of silence in the face of
violence (Ettema 1994), many IDPs and others in
North Maluku and North Sulawesi discussed the
violence in all its detail on a regular basis. Veena
Das (1984: 5), discussing violence in South Asia,
has noted that the survivors of communal
violence that she worked with “wanted their
suffering to become known as if the reality of it
could only be reclaimed after it had become part
of a public discourse”. I found a similar situation
in Halmahera and North Sulawesi where many
were eager, some insistent, to have their stories
heard and recorded.
In many cases displaced people and others
involved in the conflict wanted their experiences
to be included in my research to ensure that I
got the “whole story”. They wanted their voices
to be heard as a corrective to the “facts” put out
by a government they mistrusted or biased
media outlets. They often stated their belief that
if the world knew the explicit details of what
was happening in North Maluku it would come
to their rescue. People would pass on stories
they thought I needed to hear, or would insist 
I go and hear them myself. And for them, the
more gruesome the tale, the better. For example,
when the wife of a minister who had been killed
during the conflict was visiting Manado, a
number of IDPs contacted me and insisted I talk
to her. As one man put it: “You really need to
talk to her for your research. They wrapped her
husband up in a mattress and burned him alive.
This is the important kind of information that
you need”. In another example a man from the
island of Doi sought me out in Tobelo because
10 The Devil is in the Detailshe had heard that I was interviewing people
about the violence: “I heard Mr Chris was
recording people’s stories from the conflict. They
told me I could find you here. I came to explain
to you what happened on Doi Island. So you can
record it.” At times it seemed as if people
thought that the intensity of their own suffering
would enhance their credibility as informants.
Robben (1995: 83) notes one problem inherent
in this type of fieldwork interaction when he
warns of the “dangers of seduction” that
ethnographers face when gathering accounts 
of violence from both victims and perpetrators.
People involved in communal conflict have a
great stake in ensuring that the anthropologist
adopts their point of view and hopefully
reiterates it in her publications. Thus, informants
must persuade (or “seduce” to use Robben’s
phrase) the anthropologist into accepting 
their accounts of the violence as the “correct”
ones that supersede those recorded from the
other side.
Talking about the violence in this way served
several purposes for IDPs. It highlighted the
violence in their relations with the rest of the
world and helped to maintain the reality of the
conflict even after the conflict had ceased. The
continuing presence of the violence justified their
enduring sense of suffering. These narratives
allowed them to continually reiterate their claims
to being victims, which needed to be made for
several reasons. On the most basic level, it
justified their demands for aid from the
government and NGOs. On another level, their
suffering needed to be reified because the
violence and pain they had experienced now
compromised an integral part of how they
defined themselves, and were defined by others.
For example, individuals were often directly
identified by the particular tragedy they had
endured. People were introduced by name and
number of kin lost: “This is Mr. X, he lost his
wife and both children in the sinking of the
Cahaya Bahari”. Another woman was
introduced to me in Togoliua as “This is Mrs X,
she lost 12 family members in the massacre at
the mosque”. Just as their religion had come to
play a larger role in their cultural identity due to
the nature of the conflict, so too did their sense
of victimhood.
A key aspect of social introductions among IDPs
in North Sulawesi and North Maluku was a
discussion of a person’s experiences during the
violence, to convey how they and their family
had suffered. This information allowed others to
establish exactly who they were talking to, as
well as the nature of what they could discuss.
For example, when I brought along one research
assistant to help in interviews, who was also an
IDP, he invariably felt it necessary to start the
discussion with a brief review of his own
experiences and the fate of the various branches
of his family. His story, one version that 
I recorded, usually ran as follows: 
I am an IDP [pengungsi] from Ternate. I was
in Ternate when the Muslims rioted and tried
to kill all of us. It took us totally by surprise.
There was nothing we could do. . . I walked
out of my house and there were people
with white headbands everywhere with
machetes and they wanted to kill us all. . .
My family escaped but we lost everything.
Everything. I spent over 20 years building a
house, buying nice things for my family. We
were not poor. We had a television, a stereo,
a refrigerator, a satellite dish, they took it all.
Now I have nothing. . . My [extended] family
suffered a lot during the violence. We [my
immediate family] lost everything in Ternate
and had to flee to Manado. One of my
older brothers was killed by the white troops
in Ternate. We never found his body, but
they say his head was chopped off. My sister
fled Ternate with her family to Morotai, and
then fled to Tobelo when the Muslims
attacked Morotai. I lost my younger brother
on the Cahaya Bahari [a ship that sank]. My
other older brother [a soldier in the army]
was thrown in jail in Morotai because they
thought he would protect the Christians and
fight the Muslims. My sister’s son lost
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attacked. So my family has truly 
known suffering.
Only once he had established his own list of
woes, could we move on to the interview. Often
when people came to an IDP camp for the first
time looking for relatives or friends, they would
sit down near the entrance and introduce
themselves to the people (often men)
congregated there. The introduction often led to
a brief discussion of their experiences during the
conflict, where they had fled, which family
members had perished, how they had died, etc.
They were essentially providing a resume of their
suffering. Only after these facts had been
established would they move on.
This suffering was not only important in
mediating relations between IDPs, but it also
played a role in defining them to others, in
particular to host communities. Once the conflict
had ended, the IDPs were largely defined by
their displacement. This fact was not lost on
them. They realized that as soon as they ceased
to be seen in this way, and were no longer seen
as victims of social conflict, their welcome in host
communities would grow cold.7 This was
exemplified by the experiences of Muslim IDPs in
Ternate. This particular group of IDPs had
developed a reputation for being arrogant and
violent in the eyes of local community members.
Many people in Ternate were uncomfortable
with their continuing presence and saw them as
a hindrance to the full recovery of the city.
Furthermore, the population of IDPs was almost
as large as the town population itself, thus many
locals felt intimidated by their presence. The IDPs
had demonstrated a number of times when they
felt their aid has been misappropriated and at
times these demonstrations had turned violent.
With fading support from the host community,
the Ternate city government was able to 
return several thousand of these IDPs back to
Tobelo in late 2002, some against their will
(Duncan 2005b).
The Christian IDPs from North Maluku were well
aware of the various uses to which their own
stories of violence and suffering (or those of
others) could be put, and what it could gain
them in terms of aid, jobs, or sympathy,
particularly from Western church-based
organizations. Many of these Westerners had
their own ideas of who had suffered the most
and needed their help. They appeared to have
an implicit hierarchy upon which they based their
aid distribution. Although giving aid to anyone
truly in need, these largely church based
organizations, seemed to focus on survivors from
two particular places: the village of Duma in the
sub-district of Galela and the village of Lata-lata
near Bacan. The village of Duma was of
particular significance for two main reasons.
First, on June 19, 2000 attacking Muslim forces
overwhelmed Duma and killed over 150 men,
women and children. A number of the survivors
then boarded the Cahaya Bahari, an
overcrowded passenger ship that left Tobelo
bound for Manado, but disappeared at sea. Only
10 of the more than 550 passengers on aboard
were ever found. Second, Duma was the
location of the first Protestant church in North
Maluku. Dutch missionaries had acquired their
first North Moluccan converts there in 1896 and
the missionary who had overseen these initial
conversions was buried in the village cemetery.8
Church-based reports often mentioned this
missionary history when discussing the violence
at Duma (cf. Kerr 2001; Cry Indonesia 2002).
The second group of displaced favored by
church-based organizations came from the
village of Lata-lata located on a small island 
off the coast of Bacan. Lata-lata was attacked 
on February 5, 2000 and quickly defeated. 
The approximately one thousand survivors 
were then forcibly converted to Islam, 
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7 For more on relations between IDPs and host communities see
Duncan (2005b; 2005c). 
8 I would be remiss to not point out that linguists from the
Summer Institute of Linguistics (also known as the Wycliffe Bible
Institute) had lived in Duma for several years prior to the violence,
a factor that increased its visibility in the West, as well as increasing
its significance as a target (cf. Al Bunyan 2000).a process that included supposedly circumcising
every member of the community. This tale of
forced conversions was a favourite in church-
based accounts of the violence.
These organizations often placed accounts of
violence from Duma or Lata-lata in their reports
(cf. International Christian Concern 2001;
Compass Direct 2002). These stories often
included testimonials from survivors that
provided graphic details of the violence (often
accompanied by photographs):
[Jane Doe] a 16-year-old girl is one of the
young people who were wounded in the
attack on Duma while trying to defend their
church. With tears in her eyes, she
recounted the events of that day. ‘My legs
were hit with bullets fired by the Jihad
warriors as I was trying to roll fuel drums in
the path of the advancing warriors in an
attempt to form a barricade, but the bullets
were piercing through the drums. I just
didn't want them to take our church. I fell
to the ground wounded and was helped by
some of the young people. My father and
older brother were killed. They burned my
father alive and cut my brother to pieces
with their machetes’. (International Christian
Concern 2001: 4).
Some Indonesians accused these organizations of
sensationalism a valid criticism since most of
these reports were aimed primarily at fundraising.
Many IDPs in North Sulawesi and elsewhere
quickly learned how these organizations
responded to survivor’s accounts and some would
adjust their stories accordingly, inserting the
proper catchphrases to fit the perceptions of
these Westerners and garner more aid.
During the conflict, both sides exploited these
stories for their own ends, whether to raise
funds or solicit recruits. Eyewitness accounts
from survivors of the violence in Tobelo circulated
in Muslim communities by word of mouth and
in Indonesian magazines and on the Internet
often accompanied by graphic photos of corpses
and mass graves (cf. Hidayatullah 2000; TIPKPU
2000). Muslim magazines in Indonesia, both
radical and mainstream, ran dozens of stories
covering the violence in detail. For example: 
‘Only by the power of Allah am I still alive’,
said Munir (22) surviving victim of the
massacre at the Al-Muhajirin mosque, in
Popilo, Tobelo (Maluku Utara). ‘I saw people
massacred in the mosque’, he said again,
with tears falling. 
When the village was invaded, Munir ran to
the Al-Muhajirin mosque. A member of the
red (Christian) troops then speared his chest
from the upper left side though to the right.
Blood spurted, and Munir began his death
throes. It was not enough to spear [him];
they then twisted the spear so that it pierced
him more. Munir’s body stopped moving. 
Munir’s body was shaken repeatedly to
make sure he was dead. Once they thought
he was dead, Munir was thrown onto a pile
of corpses of people that had just been
massacred in the Al-Muhajirin mosque.
‘Most of those corpses were not whole, they
were destroyed. I was buried under six layers
of corpses. Other people around me were
waiting for their predestined hour of death’
(Hidayatullah 2000).
In addition to print media, a popular avenue for
the distribution of these accounts, particularly
among the Muslim community, was on video
compact discs (VCDs) (Spyer 2002). A staple of
these VCDs was graphic footage of the
aftermath of the killings in Popilo. After the
armed forces arrived in Popilo they buried the
corpses from the large-scale killing in a mass
grave, an action that was recorded on video. The
images of bulldozers pushing dozens of bodies
into a large grave appear in numerous VCDs
about the conflict in Maluku and North Maluku
and angered Muslims across the archipelago.
Although people in North Maluku were aware of
the strategic value of particular incidents of
violence, they were also aware of how accounts
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themselves could affect their image and access
to aid. They had to deal with the reality that
both sides had inflicted suffering on others. The
political elite (both Muslim and Christian) were
well aware of the bad publicity that could result
from these accounts of violence. In some cases
they sought to silence the more graphic
descriptions: photos were destroyed; topics were
marked out as ones to be avoided; people were
scolded for telling the “wrong stories” to
foreigners. For example, the Christian elite in
Tobelo often discouraged discussing the details
of fighting that took place in Tobelo arguing that
if Westerners heard the graphic details, it would
affect their willingness to provide aid for
Christians. They could not maintain total control
of these discussions, however, as these events
were favourite topics of discussion throughout
the region. They might disappear at the
appearance of a tape recorder, but once the tape
recorder was gone they would be brought back
on the table.
It is important to realize that these two types of
stories – those of victims and those of
perpetrators – are not as distinct as many
outside observers would suggest. Oftentimes,
stories about suffering are used to justify stories
about acts of violence. As much as people
respected victimhood in North Maluku, they also
respected gallantry and ruthlessness in the face
of the enemy. Telling stories about the violence,
whether by victims or perpetrators, was a major
aspect of social life in communities throughout
Halmahera during 2001 and 2002. People would
recount their roles in the violence, who they had
killed, how they had killed them and what they
had seen. Again, as when trying to establish
victimhood, people appreciated the more
gruesome stories. The exhilaration of hearing
eyewitness accounts of the suffering of their
enemies often brought shrieks of delight and
laughter from the crowd. For example, I
interviewed two men who took part in the
fighting in Halmahera after they had been forced
from their own homes:
We were at [a particular battle] when it
happened. . . We captured six men. [Our
commander] tied them up and told us to
bring them [back] for questioning. We were
in charge of one prisoner. . . He asked to be
spared and said he had been forced to take
part in the fighting or be killed. We were
not going to kill him, but then a man whose
brother had been killed, came and shot him
with an arrow from close range. His
intestines were coming out of his body 
from the wound, so we figured he was
going to die. So we killed him to put him
out of his misery.
When asked to explain these acts of violence,
the same sort that are decried as atrocities when
committed by the other side, the justification
usually consists of a reference to previous
atrocities committed by the enemy elsewhere.
After recording one particularly detailed account
of a massacre from one of the perpetrators, I
asked how he justified such actions, in particular
the killing of women, children and the elderly.
After a brief confused look, as he pondered the
ridiculous nature of my question, his answer
was: “They started killing us first. So we had 
to kill them”. 
Conclusion
As the above account demonstrates, close
attention to the way in which participants in
communal conflict discuss acts of violence can
provide insight into how local communities and
individuals were caught up in conflict. The details
of these accounts, how they are presented and
the audience for which they are presented, help
explain how the violence was actualized and
justified on ground during the conflict. The
details of these acts of violence, enhanced with
each re-telling, can explain the course that the
violence took and its changing intensity.
Oftentimes people were spurred to action by
these stories or their anger and sense of injustice
was intensified. Through an analysis of these
accounts we can better understand the moral
and ethical choices made by participants. 
14 The Devil is in the DetailsFurthermore, these accounts of violence by both
victims and perpetrators, can help us understand
how people are coping with their past
experiences in post-conflict situations. The styles
and locations of these retellings, whether they
be a form of social introductions, story-telling, or
providing accounts for foreign NGOs, can also
provide insight into how participants are shaping
their lives in relation to their past experiences.
North Moluccans are well aware of the power of
these narratives and how they can be deployed
to achieve particular ends. It behooves academics
to also pay attention to the details of these
narratives. Closer attention to these accounts of
violence and to the individual decisions and lived
experiences of participants can provide a far
more nuanced understanding of communal
violence than a reliance on bland metanarratives.
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